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Abstract
In this work we introduce a new formal model for software components supporting behavioral
interpretability based on temporal logic, Petri nets, model checking, and an assume–guarantee
strategy to specify and reason about the composition of concurrent component systems. The formal
specification and verification strategies, methods, and techniques presented in this work contribute
to the development of more dependable component-based software systems, in a modular way. An
approach based on two complementary formalisms, Hierarchical Colored Petri Nets (HCPN) and
temporal logic, is introduced. HCPN are used to visualize the structure and model the behavior of
software architectures and components, and temporal logic is used to specify the required properties
of software architectures and component interfaces.
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1. Introduction
Component-based software development promotes the design of evolving complex
software systems, on the basis of the recovery of components from a repository and
plugging them together to build less fragile and more dependable systems applica-
tions [20,6]. However, as pointed out by Lumpe and Schneider in [14], part of the fragility
is merely transferred from the component artifacts to the connectors and the composition
process adopted. Therefore, there is no guarantee that the resulting software system is
more robust, dependable, or reliable that any other one developed using other approaches.
According to [20], improving the theoretical and practical foundation of composition tech-
niques is thus essential for improving the overall component software dependability and
reliability.
Another important trend that should be taken into account in the context of software
engineering is the reusability of different artifacts produced during the development of a
system. In addition to code, analysis and design models can also be reused. This is manda-
tory for improving the product time to market, software quality, and maintenance, and for
decreasing development costs. In this context, software frameworks have been introduced
as a possible way of supplying these needs.
Our focus is the compositional formal specification and verification of concurrent
embedded systems using component models [8,15,13]. The required behavioral properties
are given by a specification, which precisely defines what the system must perform.
Formal methods provide a rigorous mathematical guarantee that a software system
conforms to a given specification. Formal methods can be mainly classified as proof-
theoretic and model-theoretic. In the first case a deductive system is used, and correctness
proofs are built using a theorem prover as a model checker [1]. In the second case, a
model of the run-time behavior of the software is built, and this model is automatically
checked for the required properties. In this work, the emphasis is on model-theoretic
methods. The use of formal models aggregates some advantages to the development
process, such as automatic verification of properties before developing the system,
as well as the detection of logical errors and simulation. Hierarchical Colored Petri
Nets (HCPN) [10,11] is the modeling formalism adopted, and the Design/CPN [12]
set of tools is used to edit and analyze the models. The use of HCPN allows
more compact and organized models because of hierarchy and complex data type
features. The ASK/CTL library [3] is used in the verification process. It allows the
description of properties on the basis of computation tree logic and for model checking
purposes [4].
The main objective of this work is to apply methods and techniques to formally specify
and verify embedded systems using the concepts of components and to define a modular
reasoning strategy based on an assume/guarantee paradigm. Besides focusing on this main
objective, other concepts are invoked, such as: product lines [5]; software architecture [18];
and components [20,6]. These concepts are used in order to define a development process
that allows one to assemble systems on the basis of a framework [7].
This work is organized as follows. In Section 2 concepts related to temporal logic are
introduced. In Section 3 the development process as defined in [7] is presented. In Section 5
the concept of Component-Based Petri Nets (CBPN) and how it can be applied to the
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specification and verification of embedded systems are detailed. In Sections 6 and 7 a
modular strategy analysis for CBPN and related works are presented. Finally, in Section 8
some conclusions and future work are discussed.
2. Temporal logic
Temporal logic is a modal logic that can be used to describe how events occur over
time. There are operators for describing safety, liveness, and precedence properties. Thus,
a framework for specifying software systems, particularly concurrent systems, is provided.
In this paper, a Computation Tree Logic (CTL) [4] defined for colored Petri nets named
ASK-CTL [3] is used. In what follows the basic concepts of both logics are introduced.
The CTL temporal logic combines path quantifiers with linear time temporal logic
operators. The path quantifiers A (“for all paths”) and E (“for some paths”) should be
used as a prefix of one of the operators G (“always”) F, (“sometimes”), X (“next time”),
and U (“until”). The syntax of CTL is given by the following rules:
(1) If ϕ ∈ AP , then ϕ is a formula, where AP is a set of atomic propositions.
(2) If ϕ1 and ϕ2 are formulas, then ¬ϕ1, ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, and ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 are also formulas.
(3) If ϕ1 and ϕ2 are formulas, then EXϕ1, EGϕ1, and E[ϕ1Uϕ2] are formulas.
Other CTL operators are expressed using the three operators EX, EG, and E[U],
and: AXϕ ≡ ¬EX¬ϕ, EFϕ ≡ E[trueUϕ], AGϕ ≡ ¬EF¬ϕ, AFϕ ≡ ¬EG¬ϕ, and
A[ϕ1Uϕ2] ≡ ¬E[¬ϕ2U(¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2)] ∧ ¬EG¬ϕ2.
The semantics of CTL is defined with respect to paths in a state transition graph or a
Kripke structure [4], denoted by M . A path is an infinite sequence of states (s0, s1, . . .)
such that si+1 is reached from si for all i ≥ 0. Therefore, if ϕ is a CTL formula, M, s |= ϕ
denotes that ϕ holds for s in M .
The four most commonly used CTL operators are EF, AF, EG, and AG, their
definitions are as follows.
EFϕ ≡ E[trueUϕ] means that there exists a path starting from state s0 in which ϕ holds
at some state along this path.
AFϕ ≡ A[trueUϕ] means that for all paths starting from state s0, ϕ holds at some state
along the path.
EGϕ ≡ ¬AF¬ϕ means that there exists a path starting from state s0 in which ϕ holds at
every state along this path.
AGϕ ≡ ¬EF¬ϕ means that for all paths starting from state s0, ϕ holds at every state
along that path; thus ϕ holds globally.
ASK-CTL is a CTL-like logic useful for specifying properties related to CPN (Colored
Petri Nets) state spaces, represented by occurrence graphs. Occurrence graphs carry
information on both nodes and edges. Hence, a natural extension for CTL is including the
possibility of expressing properties concerning the information labeling for the edges (e.g.,
edge information is needed when expressing liveness properties since liveness is expressed
by means of transition occurrence information). For this purpose, two mutually recursively
syntactic categories of formulas are defined, state and transition formulas, which are
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Fig. 1. The component-based development cycle.
interpreted for the occurrence graph for states and transitions respectively [2]. Quantified
state formulas and transition formulas are interpreted along paths. Path quantification is
used in combination with the until operator to express temporal properties.
The ASK-CTL library is composed by two parts: one which implements the ASK-CTL
logic language, and another one which implements the model checker. The ASK-CTL syn-
tax is minimal, and in order to increase the readability of the formulas, syntactic sugars are
used, e.g., POS(ϕ) means that it is possible to reach a state where ϕ holds, INV(ϕ) means
that ϕ holds at every reachable state, and EV(ϕ) means that ϕ holds within a finite number
of steps for all paths.
3. The component-based specification and verification process
In Fig. 1 we show the development cycle for component-based software systems
defined in [7] and used in the context of this paper. As our focus is on a model-based
development process, the modeling phase is the key to a successful design. This is mainly
due to the fact that a “bad” model can compromise the implementation and validation
of the system for the users or clients, thus increasing the costs. Moreover, the use of
formal methods allows automatic analysis before the implementation, and can be used
as an effective documentation tool. On the basis of such considerations, as stated in
the introduction, HCPN is the formal method adopted in this paper. Observe that just
the requirements and system phases are not considered, since they are not modeling
specific.
Another advantage of using a well defined and formal modeling process is the
possibility of automating the phases. For instance, automatic code generation is possible,
by associating code with the framework and with the models of the components.
Some syntax for naming the elements of the HCPN models and then generating code
automatically can be defined. Since the framework is fixed, and all the connections,
restrictions, decisions, and locations are defined, code can be associated with the
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framework and thus, bith, the model but and the framework code can de reused. The
same consideration applies to the components, but in this case each specific component
has its own associated code. When the project is changed, by modifying the components,
a refactoring strategy at the model level instead of the code level is being applied. Such
refactoring is much simpler than that at code level. This discussion also applies if all the
code is generated from scratch using a given syntax definition, as mentioned above.
In this work the architecture is formally defined by means of a framework described by
an HCPN. On the basis of this framework one can then proceed to recover models from a
repository or develop new ones on the basis of the requirements of the project. In some sit-
uations, recovered models of components need to be adapted to satisfy a specific use case
for each project. Having the framework and all the components, it is possible to go one
step further to the integration phase. Then, the models for the components are integrated
in the framework. The next step is the use verification. This step is necessary to guaran-
tee that the whole model does not violate the semantics of the individual models for the
components. Moreover, the use verification is useful for validating new models specifically
developed for a new project and for making them available in the repository to be used in
future projects.
4. Specification and verification
In this section the formal specification and verification of an embedded system using
HCPN and the process described in Section 3 are introduced. As pointed out in the
introduction, HCPN promotes more compact and organized descriptions due to the fact
that it incorporates concepts such as complex data types and hierarchy, that can be used by
the designer to structure a model. The hierarchy is defined by two mechanisms, namely,
substitution transitions and fusion places. The first can be used to represent another model,
named the page. A page represented by a substitution transition is a sub-page, whereas the
page where the transition appears is called a super-page. Thus, each page is a CPN and all
the pages “glued” together result in an HCPN model. The pages are “glued” by means of
ports in the sub-pages, that are associated with sockets in the super-page – that is, the input
and output places of the substitution transition. Fusion places are distinct places that are
associated with a fusion set and always have the same marking. The marking of a place
is a multiset1 of tokens in a place in a given moment. Therefore, changing the marking
of a place in a fusion set results in changes in the markings of all places defined for the
fusion set. In the case of ports and sockets the same behavior is observed. Using these two
mechanisms it is possible to organize the models by modularizing them. We remark that
it is important to observe that this modularization is merely visual and the behavior of the
model is interpreted on the basis of a plain CPN model.
As stated before, the application domain considered in the scope of this paper is
an embedded transducer network control system, composed of a set of transducers, a
communication server, and a real-time server, as detailed in [17]. The environment signals
acquired by the sensors are transformed and controlled such that the real-time server
1 A multiset is a set where it is possible to have several occurrences of the same element.
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Fig. 2. The colored Petri net hierarchy for the model.
can access and modify the information for controlling the actuators, according to the
applications requirements. Several different applications may access the real-time server
to acquire data and to control different devices.
An important observation concerning the specification in the scope of this work is
that details related to specific technologies used to implement the components are not
considered. The focus is on the specification and analysis of the architecture of the system.
This is also due to the fact that one of the main objectives of this work is related to modular
verification techniques. Therefore, properties of the interfaces of the components and the
architecture are verified, regardless of their internal details. For instance, the particular
protocol implemented for the embedded system to communicate with the control system,
running in the real-time server, is not considered.
4.1. Specification
In Fig. 2 the HCPN hierarchy specifying the architecture for the system is shown.
The System page models the sensors and actuators that communicate only with the
embedded system. The Embedded page is the model for the embedded system, and it is
shown in Fig. 3. There are several components defined for the embedded system page.
The information is exchanged between the devices and the embedded system using a
blackboard mechanism. The input and output interpreter, or I/O interpreter (IOInterpreter
as shown in Fig. 2), is used to instantiate the data written in the blackboard as objects.
Also, this component receives objects from the system and translates them to the data
format used by the devices. The next component is the data converter, DataConvert. This
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Fig. 3. The embedded system CPN page.
component translates data from the I/O interpreter to a format used by the real-time server,
as defined by the applications. Therefore, this component must be changed to satisfy
particular requirements of each project. The data flow is defined in the data converter
component. If the data is a control request, such as an initialization or calibration signal,
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the data is then sent to the device controller. On the other hand, if the data is an information
signal, it is sent to the synchronizer and then to the real-time server.
The device controller component, DeviceContro, is used to control devices. An
application might issue requests to change the configuration attributes for a given device,
for example, the sampling rate. The device controller implements such changes. The
synchronizer is a realization of the communication between the embedded system and
the real-time server. When an information signal is sent by a sensor, it must be transmitted
to the real-time server through the synchronizer. Thus there is one synchronizer for the
embedded system and another one for the real-time server. Since this communication
pattern does not change, the synchronizer is a fixed component in the architecture.
The real-time server, RealTime, is used to mediate the communication between the
embedded system and a set of applications. A database with information about the network
and the applications is used to promote this communication. The applications can read or
write information in order to control a system. In Fig. 4 the components of the real-time
server are shown. The synchronizer is identical to the one in the embedded system. The data
controller, DataContolle, is used to control the data flow from and to the applications. The
user interface module (UIModule) component makes services available to the applications
that access the system.
In Figs. 3 and 4 the dashed lines indicate components that can be replaced, or hot spots,
whereas the continuous lines indicate components that do not need to be changed, or frozen
spots.
On the basis of this architecture, and the process described in Section 3, one can specify
any control system as defined in the context of this paper, and then allow a product line
evolution based on the reuse of models of components. Moreover, this strategy allows the
practice of refactoring at a model level and not only code level.
4.2. Verification
In this section the models introduced are used to prove properties on the basis of model
checking. To do this, in a first step, properties to be proven are identified and defined.
As the properties to be proven are related to the architecture and to the interface of the
components, the model of the framework is used without taking into account internal
details of the components. Therefore, functional scenarios are identified in order to define
relevant properties to be proven. Message Sequence Charts (MSC) are used to describe the
scenarios. They are automatically generated during the simulation of the HCPN model.
The verification strategy defined in this work consists of the following steps: (i)
identification of scenarios; (ii) automatic MSC generation for each scenario, based on
the model; (iii) definition of the properties to be proven on the basis of the scenarios;
(iv) definition of atomic propositions and temporal logic formula specifications; and (v)
performing model checking.
Let us assume that the devices send an initial signal when the system is turned on or a
new device is plugged in. Also, suppose that the system performs some task when it re-
ceives this kind of message, and sends back to the device an acknowledgement, calibration,
or even an initialization message. The MSC shown in Fig. 5 relates to this scenario. When
a device sends an initialization signal, the data converter sends it to the device controller
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Fig. 4. A real-time server.
Fig. 5. Data converter flow for the control signal.
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Fig. 6. Data converter flow for the information signal.
to perform the associated control tasks. Since an MSC diagram is generated on the basis
of simulation it captures a single execution sequence or information flow in the model.
Therefore, it might be the case that there is some situation where this expected sequence or
flow is violated. Thus, the scenario must be verified for all possible situations to guarantee
that the expected flow is always satisfied. To do this, model checking is used.
Considering again the scenario shown in Fig. 5, it must be proven that when an
ini message is sent by some device, the flow is always through the device controller.
The formula AG(P A → AF(P B)) specifies this scenario. The proposition P A is true
when there is a token in place IODConIn (input of the Data Converter) for the page
Embedded, with an initialization signal (ini); and P B is true when there is a token in place
DevControlIn (input of the Device Controller) for the page Embedded. Thus, the formula is
true if P A is true and eventually P B is also true. This means that if there is a token in the
input of the data converter, this token is sent to the input of the device controller. The device
controller is the component that implements control tasks such as initialization, calibration,
and changing working parameters for the devices. The evaluation of this formula to true
means that this part of the model behaves as expected for all possible executions. The same
reasoning can be used to prove that the information flow back to the device also occurs as
expected, for all possibilities.
Let us suppose now that the signal is a normal measurement signal sent by a sensor.
This information, that is, what is measured by the sensor, must be sent to the synchronizer
and then to the real-time server. In Fig. 6 the MSC for this scenario is shown. For the real-
time server the information is manipulated by a specific control application, depending on
the sensor and the information itself. It might be the case that the information is returned
to the embedded system to make it available to an actuator. The formula specifying this
scenario is: AG(P A → AF(P B)). The proposition P A is evaluated to true if there is
a token in place IODConIn for the page Embedded, that is, the data converter input; and
proposition P B is evaluated to true if there is a token in place DConOutSync for the page
Embedded. Thus, the formula is evaluated to true if P A is evaluated to true and eventually
P B is evaluated to true. Thus, if true, it proves that when the token for an information
signal is in the input of the data converter, it is always sent to the synchronizer in order to
be transmitted to the real-time server.
For the synchronizer there are two complementary models, one for the embedded
system and another one for the real-time server – thus, modeling a full-duplex
communication channel. When a token is in the input of the embedded system synchronizer
L.D. da Silva, A. Perkusich / Science of Computer Programming 56 (2005) 171–189 181
Fig. 7. Synchronizer flow.
it will always be in the output of the real-time server synchronizer. The reasoning holds
also for the inverse flow. In Fig. 7 the MSC for this scenario is shown, and the formula
specifying it is AG(P A → AF(P B)). The proposition P A is evaluated to true if
there is a token in place SyncIn for the page Embedded, the input of the embedded
system synchronizer. Proposition P B is evaluated to true if there is an identical token
in place SyncOutRT for the page RealTime, the output of the real-time synchronizer. The
complementary part of this flow can be proven following the same reasoning. It is only
necessary to change PA to verify the input of the real-time synchronizer and PB to verify
the output of the embedded system synchronizer.
4.3. Considerations concerning the verification
As stated before, in this work the focus is on the interaction among components
and the architecture regardless of specific technical component details. It is important to
observe that the proofs are performed at the interface level of the components. This can de
considered a modular reasoning mechanism. Following the concepts of components, reuse
of models, model-based development, design patterns, refactoring, software architecture,
and product line, a strategy for software modeling has been introduced. This strategy has
been applied to an embedded control system. It is important to point out that a specific data
format can be used in an application, such as real numbers. Therefore, the data converter
needs to deal with this. In this case, besides the control and information flow, how data is
manipulated must be verified. For example it is necessary to prove that the data converter
always performs the correct data transformation.
The properties to be proven depend on the kinds of components used and also on the
system being developed. The formal specification and verification approach presented in
this work and its application to the embedded system domain represent a contribution to
software development in relation to modular reasoning and model-based development and
refactoring.
5. Composition
In this section the concept of Component-Based Petri Nets (CBPN) is introduced. Also
the application of CBPN to model systems based on components is discussed. The basic
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Fig. 8. Composition of HCPN models.
description language is Colored Petri Nets (CPN), for which there is no semantics defined
for communication and composition of modules. In Fig. 8 we show how individual
components modeled on the basis of CPN are put together in a hierarchy. The System
model is the top level model defined for the hierarchy. Associated with this model there
is a substitution transition that represents the CPN model Embedded. The communication
between these two components is effected by interface places. The input and output places
of the transitions for the model System are associated with the input and output ports for the
Embedded model. Using this mechanism, the hierarchy shown at the bottom of the figure
is defined. It is important to observe that there is an exact point where the model System
communicates with the model Embedded. This is the role of the architecture. Actually,
the Embedded model is itself composed of several models. The System, Embedded, and
the RealTime models for the hierarchy are fixed and they define the architecture of the
system. The other models specify components that perform the features or functionalities
of the system. For analysis purposes, all modules are put together, thus resulting in a flat
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Fig. 9. Use of the assume–guarantee model.
model, without modularity. Thus, our objective is to define mechanisms for promoting a
compositional analysis by separating the models for analysis purposes.
Using assume–guarantee techniques it is possible to define and use, for verification
purposes, the behavior of a model without having knowledge of its internal structure. This
is called black-box reuse. For such a technique it is not necessary to calculate the whole
internal state space for all the models. Each model has the assumptions and guarantees
specified by a CPN model. Thus, for each component model there is one or more assume–
guarantee model associated with it. For verification purposes an assume–guarantee model
can be substituted for the original model. This idea is illustrated Fig. 9. For this example,
the assumption is that whenever there is an information token, represented by the field info,
in place IODConIn, it is guaranteed that this token is put in place DConOutSync. This is
one possible assume–guarantee specification for the Data Converter component. Therefore,
there are assume–guarantees specifications for all the features of a component and they are
used in conjunction with the initial marking. Therefore, when the initial marking for the
model is defined, it is possible to know, and automatically generate, the assume–guarantee
specification for each model for such a situation. Thus, to perform model checking, the
models for the components are replaced by their assume–guarantee specifications and the
state space that is calculated on the basis of this technique is much smaller than when
using the original models. The formal definitions of the assumptions and guarantees in the
context of this work are as follows.
Definition 1. Let P be a finite set of places, and M a finite set of markings for a given
CPN model. An assume–guarantee specification is a function AG : Pi × Mi ⇒ Po × Mo
where:
• Pi ∈ P is an input place, and Po ∈ P is an output place;
• Mi ∈ M is the marking for place Pi , and Mo ∈ M is the marking for place Po.
An assume–guarantee specification is a function from an input place and its marking to
an output place and its marking. Informally speaking, an assume–guarantee specification
can be expressed as: whenever there are specific tokens for specific input places, there will
always be specific tokens for the specific output places.
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It is important to observe that there can be no, one, or several assume–guarantee
specifications for any CPN model; this is to reflect all the possible behaviors of the model.
Also these specifications must be used depending on what is supposed to be proved. Thus,
it might be the case that there is no need to specify all the assume–guarantee models for
each CPN model.
On the basis of Definition 1 a CBPN is defined as follows.
Definition 2. Let CBPN = (CPNM, AGS, MR) be a component-based colored Petri net;
then:
• CPNM is a finite set of CPN models for the components;
• AGS is a finite set of assume–guarantee specifications according to Definition 1;
• MR : CPNM ⇒ 2AGS defines the set of assume–guarantee specifications associated
with a given CPN model.
In the context of this work an assume–guarantee specification is represented by a CPN
model, as illustrated in Fig. 9. Also, it is important to observe that a composition of com-
ponents is still a component. Thus, it is possible to say that the architecture itself is a com-
ponent, and the components plugged into the architecture can still be seen as a component.
6. A modular reasoning strategy
In this section we describe a modular reasoning strategy to verify the composition of
component-based software systems. Observe that the advantages of the use of modular
techniques and reasoning are not important only at the specification level. Also, it is
important to have modular verification techniques. For the component-based software
domain it is important and recommended to apply modular reasoning strategies, methods,
and techniques to verify component-based software systems. CBPN is adopted as the
description language. As stated in Section 5, the main idea of the CBPN formalism is
to promote the development of models for software artifacts and to compose them on the
basis of reusable basic models. In order to build models, the process presented in Section 3
and detailed in [7] is adopted. An important remark is that the basic models depend on
the application domain. For each domain it is necessary to define a set of basic models
and a framework for integrating new systems for the new domain. In the following a
modular reasoning approach for verifying component-based software systems described
using CBPN is discussed.
Let Px be a set of atomic propositions, where
x = {Ai , Bi , Ci , . . . , Zi }, 1 ≤ i ∈ N. (1)
The set of components is given by
C = {C1, C2, . . . , Cn}, 1 ≤ n ∈ N. (2)
Since the components are described by CPN models, as given in Definition 2, it is
possible to rewrite Eq. (2) as follows:
CPNM = {CPNM1, CPNM2, . . . , CPNMn}, 1 ≤ n ∈ N. (3)
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Fig. 10. Composition of components.
Let us assume that a property of a specific subset of a system is to be proven. If the
system is composed of components, one can prove properties on the basis of the interfaces
of the components regardless of the internal details of the individual components. In Fig. 10
an illustration of a composition of components is shown. Using the model described
in Section 4.1, assume that the components in Fig. 10 are the I/O interpreter, the data
converter, and the device controller. These components are used when a control signal
is sent by a device. For a specific purpose, a proof related to the interface, say P A and
P B , is sufficient; that is, it is only necessary to prove properties related to the interface.
But suppose that a proof for the complete flow related to the control activity for this model
must be found. In this case it is necessary to prove the interface properties for all the
components for the flow, say, C1, C2, and C3. The scenario for this case is illustrated by
the message sequence chart shown in Fig. 11.
The proof is performed by proving properties related to the interfaces of the components
defined in Fig. 10, by using PA1 and PB1, PA2 and PB2, PA3 and PB3. The granularity of
the proof depends on what is supposed to be proven. Thus, the proof is defined as a set of
proofs:
V = {V1, V2, . . . , Vm}, 1 ≤ m ∈ N. (4)
Considering that the components can be represented by their assumptions and guarantee
specifications as described in Section 5, Eq. (4) can be written as
V = {VAG1, VAG2, . . . , VAGm }, 1 ≤ m ∈ N. (5)
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Fig. 11. The message sequence chart for the modular verification scenario.
On the basis of the scenario shown in Fig. 11 and the model of the embedded system
presented in Fig. 8, the atomic propositions and the formulas for performing the proof can
be specified. Also the atomic propositions associated with the interfaces of components
C1, C2, and C3 are
PA1 = IOInHard, PB1 = IOOutComp
PA2 = IODConIn, PB2 = DConOutDevC
PA3 = DevControlIn, PB3 = DevControlOut
The formulas are
V1 = (∧(PA1, EV(PB1)))
V2 = (∧(PA2, EV(PB2)))
V3 = (∧(PA3, EV(PB3)))
where ∧ is the boolean conjunction operator and EV is the temporal eventuality operator,
as defined in Section 2. Finally, the proof is given by
V = (∧(V1, V2, V3)).
In this work more general operators for composing models of components are defined.
Therefore proofs can be composed, and a model of a system can be obtained by
composition. Let C be a set of components as defined is Eq. (2), and V a set of verifications
as defined in Eq. (4). Also, let A be the architectural part of the system. The integration
operator
⊎
represents the integration of the components together with the architecture.
The operator  is the component composition operator. Thus, a system S can be defined
as follows:
S =
(
A
⊎
C
)
. (6)
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From Eqs. (2) and (3), Eq. (6) is rewritten as follows:
CPNM =
(
A
⊎
(CPNM1  · · · CPNMn)
)
. (7)
As stated before, a composition of components is still a component, and an architecture
is a component itself. Thus,A can also be seen as a component CPNMx . We used different
notation and different operators for the architecture and the components to make explicit
the fact that the composition of components is performed using an architecture to guide the
process.
The compositional verification for a component-based system is given by
V = (V1  V2  · · · Vm). (8)
And from Eq. (5) it is possible to rewrite Eq. (8) as
V AG = (VAG1  VAG2  · · · VAGm). (9)
It is important to observe that in the context of this work a modular verification using
flow properties has been used, but other kinds of properties can be verified on the basis
of the strategy introduced. This can be accomplished be defining the appropriate atomic
propositions.
7. Related work
Petri nets have been applied as the formal foundation for component-based systems
in different research works. Some research works also pointed out the need to use
a complementary approach to deal with the inherent complexity associated with the
development of a component-based software system. He et al. [9] introduce a general
software architecture development framework based on Petri nets and temporal logic. Petri
nets are used to visualize the structure and model the behavior of software architectures,
while temporal logic is used to specify the required properties for software architectures.
Although the approach is very similar to the one introduced in this paper, aspects related to
modular verification are not taken into account. In [19] the authors introduced an approach
to component composition and validation. The approach is very similar to the process
discussed in Section 3. Other research applying Petri nets is reported by Ziaei and Agha
in [21], using the name SynchNets. The major idea is to promote the separation of the
coordination aspects from computational aspects. In [16] the authors introduce a design
strategy for evolvable architectures based on net components, named FEVA net, that are
based on Petri nets. These nets are applied for modeling business processes as well as their
consistent composition. In both cases the compositional verification is not addressed.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, a contribution towards a new formal component model supporting
behavioral interpretability based on the use of temporal logic, Petri nets, model checking,
and an assume–guarantee strategy for specifying and reasoning about the composition
of concurrent component systems is introduced. It is assumed that in addition to code,
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design models of software artifacts can be reused and composed. The formal specification
and verification strategies, methods, and techniques presented in this work contribute
to the development of more dependable component-based software systems. Also, the
components can be reused from previous successful projects and it is not necessary to
prove specific internal component properties for every new project. Instead of this, only
properties related to the new assembled or integrated model at the architectural and
interface level must be proved.
Unlike in other temporal logic and Petri net-based methods for software components,
exhaustive state-space enumeration, which can result in the well known state-explosion
problem, is avoided. To deal with the latter problem, the idea of a modular strategy analysis
approach for a CBPN model was introduced.
The approach discussed in this paper has been applied to a realistic and complex
embedded software system, including a real-time database server and a transducer
network [17]. Currently, there is a software team using the model specified and verified as
presented in this work to write down the application code, thus linking the modeling and
implementation phases, associating code with the framework and with the components.
Another important aspect is that it is possible to perform model level refactoring,
allowing the insertion of new versions of a component or even the insertion of a new
component without changing the code directly. Since time is a very important issue,
how timing properties can be taken into account for the approach introduced is being
investigated.
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